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RESPONSE
CRIMINAL LAW'S "MEDIATING RULES": BALANCING,
HARMONIZATION, OR ACCIDENT?

Michael T. Cahill*

B

efore offering a few thoughts about Professors Richard Bierschbach and Alex Stein's "Mediating Rules in Criminal Law,"
I would like to highlight just two of the several significant contributions it makes to the criminal law literature.' First, it both spotlights
and combats the tendency of theoretical work in criminal law, particularly work in the retributivist camp, to focus on certain criminal
justice issues at the expense of others. Such work typically orients
itself toward (admittedly crucial) questions about the proper justification, scope, and amount of punishment in the abstract, while
giving significantly less consideration to the various institutional
and procedural aspects of any concrete system of imposing such
punishment. Even if the substantive punishment rules were perfect,
their implementation in any real world scheme would involve compromises, if not outright distortions. Too little attention is paid to
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the translation of principle into practice, and Bierschbach and
Stein's article is a welcome effort to bridge that gap.2
A second and related strength of the article is that by widening
the scope of analysis, it expands the sense of what tools can be
used, singly or in combination, to achieve fundamental criminal
justice goals. Noting the dynamic interaction between substance
and evidentiary rules might facilitate the proactive use of what they
call "mediation" as an alternative, as well as perhaps subtler or
more nuanced means of advancing substantive goals. For example,
all too often the perceived "solution" to the problem of an offense
being-or seeming-underinclusive (in either deterrent or desertbased terms) is simply to enact another offense designed to make
up the shortfall. That method of remedying the problem, however,
can itself introduce new problems of application, interpretation,
and possible excessiveness in the scope or amount of punishment.
More broadly, it is unavoidably difficult-and perhaps impossible
as to some questions-to craft substantive rules of general application that will perfectly capture all the cases suitable for punishment
and no others. How nice it is, then, to recognize the option of tailoring evidentiary rules in ways that might correct for some of the
excesses or shortcomings of the rules in specific cases, thereby
overcoming some of the inevitable inadequacies of law or language. Notably, the possible benefits of such tailoring are not limited to its potential to mediate between deterrence and desert (the
article's focus). Rather, it also might improve the system's ability to
advance either of those goals in isolation-perhaps to "mediate"
between the dictates of desert or deterrence in an ideal world and
the budgetary or fact-gathering limitations of the real one.
Interestingly, Bierschbach and Stein do not highlight the possible benefits of deliberately manipulating evidence rules to improve
'This is not to say that these matters have been ignored entirely. Several observers
have written about the tradeoffs and sacrifices involved in the practical pursuit of substantive punishment goals, and specifically retributive goals. Some of my own work
addresses these issues, and discusses other work that does as well. See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Law Without Justice (2006) (discussing conflicts between
retributive goals and other principled and practical goals of the criminal justice system); Michael T. Cahill, Real Retribution, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008)
(discussing options for pursuing retributive goals where enforcement is subject to
practical constraints).
'See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal
Law, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 879, 936-38, 952-55 (2007).
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substantive outcomes (whether the "improvement" is in terms of
desert, deterrence, or the kind of balancing of the two that they
discuss). Even the article's normative support for mediating rules
does not quite advocate their adoption for any specific situation or
even as a general rule, but largely focuses on their possible justification given that they exist already. If there were no such rules-if
both substantive criminal law and the rules of evidence were thoroughly designed, and even coordinated, to maximize just one goal,
whether desert or deterrence-the normative case for mediating
rules as promoting liberalism or consensus-building would fall flat,
for then such rules would be forcing a compromise between one
goal everybody seems to like and another nobody seems to want.
In other words, Bierschbach and Stein can assert the value of mediating rules in promoting consensus because they operate from
the premise that there is otherwise social dissensus (either on the
whole, or as to specific issues) as to which substantive goal is appropriate: a premise supported, it seems, by the observed fact of
mediation itself. Thus the evident multiplicity of purposes within
and between the existing formulations of substantive and evidentiary rules, rather than the inherent desirability of having multiple
purposes, is what underlies Bierschbach and Stein's normative
case.
The authors' ambivalent-or really unstated-stance toward the
desirability of consciously developing more mediating rules is in
keeping with their general silence about whether existing mediating rules are a result of some conscious decision. The authors observe that some rules have the effect of mediating between desert
and deterrence, but do not explain where those rules come from, or
whether their mediating tendencies are the product of choice or
chance. The article's account is ahistorical, providing a snapshot
view of rules as they appear and interrelate at the present moment,
but not detailing which of the related rules came first or whether
the later rule was meant to respond or relate to the earlier one in
the way it actually does. I point this out not as a criticismBierschbach and Stein's identification of this apparent phenomenon is plenty interesting even if they are not able to explain how it
works-so much as a question, or suggestion of a possible area of
future investigation. Regardless of how mediating rules might develop, it is useful to note that the relationship between substantive
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rules and evidentiary rules is, or can be, dynamic, so that changes
in one might lead to responses, adjustments, or corrections from
the other. Exploring how this process works, or should work, might
be a fruitful area for further study, either from these authors or
others.
I have two other reactions to share in this brief Response, both
of which relate to questions the article raises for me about its own
scope and implications. First, it would seem that other kinds of
procedural rules might perform a similar mediating function to the
evidentiary rules Bierschbach and Stein discuss. To take just one
category of such rules, decisionmaking authority for different issues or elements in a criminal case may be allocated to the judge or
to the jury. For example, the judge rather than the jury is sometimes responsible for determining whether a defendant should receive an entrapment defense,4 or for determining whether a false
statement is material for purposes of perjury.! More generally, and
more controversially of late, issues may be allocated to the jury as
elements of the offense or reserved for the judge to decide, perhaps with a reduced evidentiary burden, at sentencing. It is possible that judges and juries differ in terms of their inclination, or capacity, to
apply
desert-based
versus
deterrence-based
considerations in making their decisions. As experts and repeat
players, judges might be able to weigh the complex empirical information necessary to pursue a utilitarian strategy. On the other
hand, lay juries might be better situated to make moral judgments
of blameworthiness. It may be worth considering whether the law
does, or should, allocate authority to judges and juries based on
their tendencies or strengths, either as a way to further a single
substantive goal or to "mediate" an overemphasis on one goal by
taking account of another.'
Second, the article seems reticent, perhaps wisely so, about
whether mediation is a zero-sum game. One version of its account
is that when one goal, desert or deterrence, "loses" to the other at
'See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.13(2) (1962).
In other words, the materiality question is categorized as an issue of law rather
than an issue of fact. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 241.1(2).
'For a discussion of the relative decisionmaking strengths of judges and juries, as
well as other institutional players such as legislatures and sentencing commissions, see
Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1124 (2005).
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the substantive-rule level, it might (or even is likely to?) "win" at
the evidentiary-rule level, thereby somehow breaking even. This is
obviously better from the perspective of that goal than if it had lost
both times, but it's also worse from the perspective of the other
goal than if that goal had won both times. Or is it? Another interpretation is that the mediation process, instead of involving I-winyou-lose tradeoffs or compromises, can lead to rule combinations
that reconcile or harmonize both goals, accomplishing both desert
and deterrence better than an alternative combination. In other
words, it probably does not matter simply that mediation occurs,
but also how the mediation occurs. For some issues, "offsetting" a
deterrence-based substantive rule with a desert-based evidentiary
rule might skew the overall balance in one direction (or it might
achieve both goals less well) relative to a mediation process that
pairs the goals with the rules in the opposite way.
Considering the matter at the broadest level-even assuming
that mediation is desirable or inevitable-there are three basic
ways mediation might be achieved: (1) adopting consistently retributivist criminal rules balanced by consistently utilitarian evidence rules; (2) adopting consistently utilitarian criminal rules balanced by consistently retributivist evidence rules; or (3) having
both retributivist and utilitarian strands in both the substantive and
evidentiary law, with each mediating the other where necessary, in
piecemeal fashion, rather than across the board. The last option is
reflected in existing law, as Bierschbach and Stein describe it. Is
that the best of the three options, either from a neutral perspective
(meaning one that favors neither desert nor deterrence in the abstract) or from the perspective of either goal considered separately? Given the choice, and forced to acknowledge that one set
of rules will mediate the other, would a diehard retributivist choose
to control all the criminal law, all the evidence law, or some of
each? Would a diehard utilitarian give the same response? Some
7 It

is worth noting here that a number of the rules Bierschbach and Stein discuss,
whether substantive or evidentiary, might be overdetermined in the sense that they
might advance, or be justified by, both desert and deterrence goals simultaneously.
Pursuing desert is one good way-perhaps the best way-to promote deterrence also.
See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 2, at 21-23, 118-19, 127-30; Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997). Similarly, a good
way to deter future violations is to punish those who have committed past violations-that is, those who deserve punishment.
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have suggested that the best possible system is one that adopts a
utilitarian strategy overall, but applies desert principles in individual cases.' On the other hand, as Bierschbach and Stein note, the
retributivist agenda tends to focus on substantive rather than procedural law and might be quite reluctant to let utilitarians have
control over the substantive rules.9 In any case, it might be interesting to consider whether differing distributions of desert-based or
deterrence-based rules as between substantive and procedural law
would seem more or less palatable, appropriate, or effective, whatever one's underlying principled commitments may be.
I find Bierschbach and Stein's piece helpful and provocative in
its willingness to break down (or at least knock a hole in) the wall
between substantive and procedural (specifically evidentiary)
law-a wall my colleague Professor Edward Cheng is more committed to keeping up than I am, which is probably in keeping with
the fact that he thinks more about evidence law and I think more
about substantive criminal law.1" Just as interesting, however, is
Bierschbach and Stein's interest in breaking down a wall within the
substantive law itself, separating utilitarians from retributivists.
There seems to be a modern trend in the direction of finding commonalities between these theories or ways to pursue both of them,
either by claiming that a desert-based scheme will promote deterrence;" or by defending a consequentialist version of retributivism
that might more easily coexist with deterrence in a broadly consequentialist scheme;12 or by giving each theory its own sphere of influence within the criminal justice system as a whole.1 "Mediating
Rules in Criminal Law" is perhaps less optimistic than these other

See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law
3-13 (1968) (identifying utilitarian considerations as a "general justifying aim" for
criminal law, but also finding retributive considerations relevant to "distribution" of
punishment, that is, decisions about which individuals to punish); John Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955) (asserting that utilitarian concerns justify
the existence of institutions of punishment, whereas retributive concerns should guide
application of punishment in particular cases).
'See Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 1, at 1205-06.
" See Edward K. Cheng, The Perils of Evidentiary Manipulation, 93 Va. L. Rev. In
Brief 191 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/09/24/cheng.pdf.
See sources cited supra note 7.
'See Cahill, supra note 2.
See sources cited supra note 8; John Bronsteen, Retribution's Role (Aug. 14,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1007091.
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efforts about the hope of finding common ground at the level of
principle, in that it assumes that the two goals are at loggerheads
and the rules must mediate their fundamental conflicts. Still, it
shares the ambition to find, and perhaps build, connections between traditionally distinct visions of criminal law and between
traditionally distinct aspects of the criminal justice system.
Preferred citation: Michael T. Cahill, Criminal Law's "Mediating
Rules": Balancing, Harmonization, or Accident?, 93 Va. L. Rev. In
Brief 199 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/09/
24/cahill.pdf.

